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Gallegos v. State, 123 Nev. Advanced Opinion 31 (Aug. 2, 2007) 1
CRIMINAL LAW – UNLAWFUL POSSESSION
Summary
Appellant Albert Gallegos was charged under NRS 202.360(1)(b), 2 in 2004, with
one count of unlawful possession of a firearm after police arrested him at his home in
Clark County and found a firearm inside that home. That charge was based on a 1998
felony warrant issued by a California superior court. The California court issued the
warrant when Gallegos failed to appear for sentencing after pleading nolo contendere to
seven felony charges. At his Nevada trial, Gallegos testified that he did not appear for his
sentencing hearing because the California superior court told him when he entered his
plea that “he’d recommend me not stepping a foot back in California ever again.” He
further testified that he did not know he needed to return for sentencing because when he
reported to the probation office shortly after he entered his plea, as directed by the
California superior court, that office had no record of Gallegos’s charges in its system.
Believing that his case had been resolved, he left California and returned to Las Vegas.
Prior to his Nevada trial, Gallegos filed a motion to dismiss the unlawful
possession charge, arguing that NRS 202.360(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague and fails
to provide sufficient notice that he cannot possess a firearm because it does not define the
term “fugitive from justice.” The court denied the motion and conducted a trial during
which the court instructed the jury that “[a] fugitive from justice is any person who has
fled from any state to avoid prosecution for a crime.” That instruction was derived from
the federal definition of “fugitive from justice” found in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(15). At the
end of the evidentiary portion of his trial, Gallegos renewed his motion to dismiss the
charge on constitutional grounds and the court again denied. The jury found that
Gallegos was a “fugitive from justice” and was guilty of unlawfully possessing a firearm
in violation of NRS 202.360(1)(b). Gallegos was sentenced to a prison term of 1 to 6
years. This appeal followed.
The Nevada Supreme Court performed a Due Process analysis: “A statute is
unconstitutionally vague and subject to facial attack if it (1) fails to provide notice
sufficient to enable persons of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is
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By Matthew Engle
The applicable part of the statute reads:
1. A person shall not own or have in his possession or under his custody or control any firearm if
he:
(a) Has been convicted of a felony in this or any other state, or in any political
subdivision thereof, or of a felony in violation of the laws of the United States of
America, unless he has received a pardon and the pardon does not restrict his right to bear
arms;
(b) Is a fugitive from justice; or
(c) Is an unlawful user of, or addicted to, any controlled substance.
A person who violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a category B felony and shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a
maximum term of not more than 6 years, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than
$5,000.

prohibited and (2) lacks specific standards, thereby encouraging, authorizing, or even
failing to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 3
NRS 202.360(1)(b) gives insufficient notice
The notice to citizens that a statute provides is insufficient if it is so imprecise and
vague that people of ordinary intelligence cannot understand what conduct is prohibited. 4
However, when the Legislature does not define each term it uses in a statute, the statute
will survive a constitutional challenge “if there are well settled and ordinarily understood
meanings for the words employed when viewed in the context of the entire statutory
provision.” 5
Here the Court concluded that the statute does not survive this first prong of the
test because the Legislature did not define the term “fugitive from justice.” NRS
202.360(1)(b). While the statute appears to be modeled on a similar federal law, that law
contained a definition of “fugitive from justice.” By not including that portion in the
Nevada law, the Legislature left it unclear whether that was intended to mean that the
Nevada definition should differ from the federal statute. As such, NRS 202.360(1)(b) as
written, leaves citizens to guess whether even an unpaid parking or traffic ticket subjects
them to the ambit of the statute.
The Court also noted that it cannot determine from the statute’s provisions
whether the person has to have been formally charged with a crime, be wanted as a
suspect but not yet indicted, be guilty of a crime but not yet discovered, be wanted for
general questioning relating to a crime, or whether the person even has to know he has
committed a crime.
Furthermore, other Nevada cases fail to give a single, well-defined definition for
the term “fugitive from justice.” For these reasons, the statute does not provide enough
notice as to what conduct it prohibits.
NRS 202.360(1)(b) lacks specific standards and thereby allows for its arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement
Under the second prong of the vagueness test, a statute is unconstitutional if it
“lacks specific standards, thereby encouraging, authorizing, or even failing to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 6 In Silvar v. District Court, the Court
analyzed and struck down a Clark County ordinance under this second prong because,
among other things, law enforcement officers had too much discretion in determining
whether the ordinance had been violated.
Like the ordinance in Silvar, the Court held that NRS 202.360(1)(b) is susceptible
to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because it does not specify the circumstances
under which a person can be arrested and prosecuted as a fugitive from justice in
possession of a firearm. It therefore establishes no clear standards to guide law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, district courts, and, ultimately, jurors as to whether a
3
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violation has occurred. Without a statutory or well-settled and commonly understood
definition of “fugitive from justice” to which Gallegos’s actions could be compared, the
prosecutor, defense counsel, and district court were left to their own personal
predilections to determine whether NRS 202.360(1)(b) could be enforced against
Gallegos.
Because NRS 202.360(1)(b) fails both prongs of the test, the Nevada Supreme
Court reversed Gallegos’s conviction and ruled the statute unconstitutional.
Issue and Disposition
Issue
Is NRS 202.360(1)(b) unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define “fugitive
from justice?”
Disposition
Yes, the Nevada Supreme Court held the statute was unconstitutionally vague
because it: (1) fails to provide notice sufficient to enable persons of ordinary intelligence
to understand what conduct is prohibited and (2) lacks specific standards, thereby
encouraging, authorizing, or even failing to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.
Dissent
Justice Parraguirre issued a dissenting opinion in which he disagrees with the
proposition that the term “fugitive from justice” is unconstitutionally vague. In it he
writes that the term has a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning. In the past, he
argues, this court has defined the term “fugitive from justice” as a person who has (1)
committed a crime in another state, (2) been charged in that state with the commission of
such crime, and (3) fled from justice and is within this state. 7 This definition, he
continues, fits within the meaning supplied by Webster’s New International Dictionary,
which identifies a “fugitive from justice” as “[o]ne who, having committed, or being
accused of, a crime in one jurisdiction, flees to avoid punishment.” 8
In light of these compatible, common definitions, the Justice argues that Gallegos has
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the term “fugitive from justice” fails to
provide sufficient notice of prohibited conduct. For this reason, Justice Parraguirre
dissented from the majority’s conclusion that NRS 202.360(1)(b) is unconstitutionally
vague.
Commentary
State of Law before Gallegos v. State
Prior to this case there was no single, well-defined definition for the term
“fugitive from justice.” Different cases have taken different approaches. For example, in
7
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Ex parte Lorraine 9 and Castriotta v. State, 10 the Court concluded that four elements are
necessary to qualify a person as a “fugitive from justice.” The person must have (1)
committed a crime in another state, (2) been charged in that state with the commission of
that crime, (3) fled from justice, and (4) been found within this state. 11
However, in Robinson v. Leypoldt the Court used a definition inconsistent with
those two cases because it stated that a person must have merely “departed” from another
state rather than “fled” - the underlying intent differs. 12 Similarly, the Court noted, the
common dictionary definition of “fugitive from justice” is broad enough to include
anyone who is absent from another state for “any reason,” without clarifying whether that
person must have intended to flee or whether leaving the state for some other purpose or
under some other state of mind is sufficient.13
In either case, this statute was being enforced as-is until this case brought the
inconsistencies of the various definitions of “fugitive from justice” before the Court.
Other Jurisdictions
This statue is modeled after federal law 18 U.S.C. § 922. However, unlike the
Nevada statute, the federal law included a specific definition of “fugitive from justice,”
thus avoiding the issue before the Nevada Supreme Court in this case. 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(15) provides that “[t]he term ‘fugitive from justice’ means any person who has
fled from any State to avoid prosecution for a crime or to avoid giving testimony in any
criminal proceeding.” Congress enacted this definition of “fugitive from justice” in
1968. 14
Effect of Gallegos v. Nevada on Current Law
This law has now been struck down as unconstitutional. To fix it the Legislature
will have to define the term “fugitive from justice” in the statute.
Unanswered Questions
This case brings up several issues for the prosecution and defendants who are
accused or have been convicted under this statute. For defendants facing charges under
the statue, the prosecution must rethink its strategy. It no longer appears that a person
can be convicted under this statute alone. However, in this case the defendant’s situation
was somewhat unusual in that it was a situation where “fugitive from justice” may or
may not have applied. The court did not address cases where the previous offense may
have been more severe, thus leaving less room for misinterpretation of the statute.
The case also calls into question any previous convictions that have been made
under this statute. Defense attorneys may be able to appeal and seek reversal for any
convictions now that the statute has been declared unconstitutional.
Lastly, an unanswered question is whether or not the Legislature will revisit that
statute in light of this opinion and add more detail to the statutory language.
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Conclusion
NRS 202.360(1)(b), which prohibits possessing a firearm when one is a “fugitive
from justice,” is unconstitutional because the term “fugitive from justice” is too vague.
The Court held that it (1) failed to provide notice sufficient to enable persons of ordinary
intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited and (2) lacked specific standards,
thereby encouraging, authorizing, or even failing to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.

